Introduction
In the past twenty years or so, there has been a major change in thinking about the appropriate role of telecommunications as growth and development enhancers. The formal literature on the topic is extensive. For instance, it has been stated that the adoption with diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) promote growth and growth promotes ICTs adoption and diffusion (Norris, 2001; Steinmueller, 2001; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; Wallsten, 2005 , Harggitai, 1999 Quibria et al., 2000; Dasgupta et al., 2001; Oxley & Yeung, 2001 ; Robison & Crenshaw, 2002; Kiiski & Pohjola, 2002; Bellock & Dimitrova, 2003; Chinn & Fairlie, 2007) . Billón, Marco and Lera-Lopez (2009) studied the patterns and factors affecting the adoption 1 of ICTs in developed and developing countries. They found that economic growth especially the service sector of it, education, and government effectiveness explain high ICT adoption rates in developed countries, while in developing countries it is the age of the urban population and internet costs that affect ICT adoption rates positively and negatively, respectively. Kiessling (2007) associated ICT adoption in 82 developed and developing countries with economic, financial, and political institutions, as well as with per capita income and education. He discovered that institutional effects on ICT adoption varied across countries, but that they were comparable in terms of magnitude to those of education and per capita GDP. However, studies like Kiessling's remain few and even fewer of them address the role of formal institutions in ICT adoption. In this limited sense, Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary (2000) are correct in asserting that existing models "are not very useful to explain the breadth of technology adoption across countries, [mainly because] they treat each country as a homogeneous unit, and cannot explain why some countries have a higher probability of adopting in a given year than others" (p. 3). Such models neglect the "wildfire phenomenon" in the spread of innovations outlined in Amavilah (2008; . Moreover, Wejnert (2002) and Young (2004; address similar issues as well. Furthermore, formal comparisons of the relative influences of each institutional quality indicator on ICT within developing countries are also missing from existing literature (for an extensive review of technology adoption theories, see for instance, Geroski, 2000; Rogers, 1995) .
The aim of this study is, first, to empirically assess the effects of good governance on ICT adoption at the country level. We analyze variations in ICT adoption across a group of 49
African countries as an illustration of how ICT catalyzes development in developing countries 1 Where the term "adoption" appears in this study, it should be read and understood as "adoption with diffusion." Under conditions of rapid technological change an ICT that is just adopted, may never be diffused, and for this reason we stress ICTs that have been adopted and penetrating the economy as catalysts for inclusive development.
(Appendix 1). Particularly, on the left-hand side (LHS) of our estimations we consider the adoption of two technologies: cellular (mobile) phone, and Internet. Obviously this list can be extended to include personal computers, broadband users, land telephone lines, etc. However, among ICTs newer technologies and/or new uses of old technologies have had stronger impacts than others. Hence, our choice of the two is enough to explain the disparities in ICT adoption among developing countries and the implications of doing so for catalyzing development.
As we discuss further later, some of the dependent variables employed in this study are:
mobile phone, and internet, penetration rates. The disparity in these rates approximate differences in ICT adoption, so that we include measures of the quality of formal institutions as predictors, and several controls. Second, once we estimated factors influencing ICT adoption, we examine how ICT catalyzes development. Such an approach departs from previous studies which have used indexes of institutional quality such that aggregation ignores the relative importance of the weight of the factors in the index (Billón et al., 2009; Caselli & Coleman, 2001 ) in all this. Our main hypothesis is that cross-country differences in institutional quality, and hence ICT adoption enhances or limits inclusive development. As proxies for good governance, we employ the World Bank indicators of governance.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 below provides a short theoretical stand behind the empirical model in Section 3. We describe key variables and data in Section 4, and implement the empirical model in Section 5. The results and their implications are in Section 6, and Section 7 draws conclusions from the exercise.
Theoretical Standing
We assume a basic Schumpeterian model in which the economic activity is described as
where, is the real GDP of the i th economy. In Schumpeter's terminology (technology, including ICT) and (socio-economic setting, including institutions) are "evolution components" and are "growth components", including conventional factors of production (Schumpeter, 2005 (Schumpeter, [1911 ; cf. Becker, Eblinger, Hedtke, and Knudsen, 2005; Bazhal, 2016) .
Key to growth among is capital accumulation, which over time depends on investment (I) equal to savings in a steady state, and savings come from profit made possible by technological change and the socio-economic setting surrounding it. The evolution of the socio-economic environment is a function of resources, technology, and the level of development. In other words, 
Then dividing both sides of (3) by some specific = * such as population or labor (worker), and taking the natural logs on both sides, we get a per capita (per labor, per worker, per head)
indicator of adoption with diffusion) as follows:
where Ȧ = log ( * ) = ; * = 1 ; ẏ = ℎ; * = ; ṡ = log ( * ) = ( ) ; * = ; ẋ = * = ℎ ; µ = ℎ . The model is next.
Empirical Model
The empirical set-up formally examines the impact of formal institutions (S) on ICT adoption (Ȧ), i.e., the estimated (4) has the following general (reduced) form:
for λ = country-fixed effect. Although assumed fixed we understand country-effect are all bunches other dummy-effects due to time and regional variations.
Again, ICT represents the average ICT adoption as cellular (mobile) phones and internet in this case, and * , * , * are parameters to be estimated. Moreover, to illustrate how ICT adoption catalyzes development we insist that economic growth promotes ICT adoption, and the relationship between GDP and ICT adoption is well documented in the development literature. For example, Harggitai (1999) , Quibria et al (2000) , Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) , Bellock and Dimitrova (2003) , and Chinn and Fairlie (2007) 
where, IHDI is the inequality adjusted human development index, δ are coefficients of development to be estimated, * ≡ Ȧ is estimated from (5), and Z are the determinants of Development not already included in (5). There is a lot on (5) in the literature, see, e.g., Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) , Detschew (2007) , UN (2004) , Papaioannou, and Dimelis (2007) , Gholami et al. (2010) , Seo et al. (2009) , and so on, but first consider key variables and data next. The next section provides details about the key variables and associated data.
Key Variables and Data

Dependent variables for ICT adoption (A = ICT)
As proxies for ICT adoption, we examine two ICT technologies: mobile phone penetration and internet penetration rates. Of course, this can be extended to broadband users, telephone lines, etc. Unlike Caselli and Coleman (2001) who measure adoption of computers as investment per worker of computer produced domestically and/or imported, here dependent variables are measured as the rate of adoption of ICT per 100 people. The adoption of these dependent variables is consistent with recent African knowledge economy literature (Tchamyou, 2015) .
Determinants of ICT adoption with diffusion
Many factors determined ICT adoption. However, in this chapter we stress only a few predictors, beginning with formal institutions.
Institutions and Institutional Quality (S)
Our key explanatory variable of interest is governance, which is a multidimensional and broad term. We define governance as the way in which policy makers are empowered to make decisions and the manner in which policy decisions are formulated and executed. The governance data come from Kauffmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi's (2010) and the World Bank 2 .
To operationalize this concept, we use a set of governance indicators that capture different aspects of governance. The World Bank indicators meet this requirement because they are constructed from several sources including polls of experts, and surveys of residents, and entrepreneurs within a country, and they could be grouped into three concepts (Kaufmann et al., 2010) . The first concept is about the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (Political Governance): voice and accountability, and political stability. The second has to do with the capacity of government to formulate and implement policies, and to deliver services (Economic Governance): regulatory quality and government effectiveness. The last deals with the respect for citizens and the state of institutions that govern the interactions among them (Institutional Governance): rule of law, and control of corruption.
Each indicator, normalized to range from −2.5 to 2.5, with a zero mean and a standard deviation of one, provides a subjective assessment of some aspect of a country's quality of 
Other variables (X)
Previous research has used many explanatory variables. Billón et al. (2009), for example, argued that disparities in ICT adoption depend on GDP per capita, population aged 15-64 years old, the fraction of GDP that comes from the service sector, foreign trade as a percentage of GDP, the country's population density, the country's size of the urban population, educational level measured conventionally as years of schooling, government effectiveness, and dummies for the dominant market structure in, language, and income level of the country.
Focusing on the computers, Caselli and Coleman (2001) associate adoption with income per worker, and investment per worker calculated either as investment in the computing power of the country, value of imports of computing goods and services, or the sum of the two.
Other variables they included were: the shares of GDP originating from agriculture and manufacturing, government spending as a percentage of GDP, manufactured imports from the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as well as non-OECD countries, the country's structure of property rights, and a dummy for language. A notable exception here is the omission of human capital.
Kiessling (2007) examines cellular telephony, internet, and personal computers (PC).
His study is closest to ours in the stress it places on economic, financial, and political critical, and we consider these as controls.
Key Development Dependent variables (Development)
The literature on the link between ICT and development is huge. The work by the UNCTAD 2011 ), UNDP (2008 , and World Bank (2009; 2012) alone counts in hundreds of papers, conferences, workshops, meetings, and so on. The problem is that development is one of those things that nearly everyone knows it and no-one knows how to measure it, or at best there is no agreed upon measure of development. Some measure development as economic development, approximated by economic (real GDP per capita) growth. In truth development is broader than economic development, which is in turn wider than economic growth. However, it
would not be appropriate to use GDP per capita growth again, because we used it already as a determinant of ICT.
An alternative measure of development is the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is broader than real GDP as it encompasses real GDP, and human capital formation in its health and education dimensions. It also has an additional advantage that it can be adjusted for inequalities due to income, wealth, poverty, gender, and so on. One of the HDI weaknesses is that it is an index, and therefore lacks sufficient variation and may cause some statistical problems in small sample regressions. However, Binder and Georgiadis (2011) argued that the HDI and real GDP are affected by variables such as macro-policies differently. In this study we opt for the inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI).
Key Development Determinants
The determinants of development are probably just as many and complex as development itself.
Estimated ICT (Ȧ ≡ ICT*)
For a set of predictors, we emphasize the role of ICT adoption as estimated in Equation 5. This is just another way of acknowledging the importance of formal institutions in development acting through ICT adoption, which differs from Binder and Georgiadis (2011), Rodrik (2000; , Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) , Acemoglu, et al., (2001) , Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) , and many others.
Other development determinants (Z)
Along with ICT, other determinants of development would include: Geography, foreign trade, FDI, remittances, and so on. Here too the literature is vast (see, e.g.., Anand et al., 2012; Mlachila et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) . In a recent paper Livramento and Foray (2007) , development is represented by "high growth entrepreneurship," which is driven by trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The paper is a Baumolian-Schmpumpterian emphasis on the entrepreneur as a driver of dynamic development, long with the level of the country's development, inflation rate, interest rate, and unemployment rate. We use domestic credit as a proxy for local capital market performance.
Data
Appendix 1 lists the group of countries included in this study. We modify the World Bank country classification in only two groups: low income and middle income. We do so because in the high income category there are only two African countries: Equatorial Guinea and Seychelles. The upper middle income group has only five African countries. This adjustment is defensible because one can argue that these countries are not advanced in terms of ICT.
As Appendix 2 shows the data used in this study were extracted from several sources.
For instance, Appendix 2.1 defines ICT variables and data sources. Appendices 2.2 and 2.3 display ICT descriptive statistics and a uniform sample correlation matrix. Our ICT dependent variables are internet penetration and mobile penetration rates. (Anand et al., 2012; Mlachila et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a) . Their expected signs are discussed concurrently with the presentation of results.
Empirical strategy
Our strategy involves estimating a set of Equations 5 and 6. The first regression in both cases is for the entire sample of 49 countries, disregarding income level categories. The second regression focuses on 28 low-income countries; the third on 21middle income countries. We use two related estimators: Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) and instrumental variable (IV)
Fixed Effects (FE), corrected for an unknown form of heteroscedasticity. The latter acknowledges issues regarding the joint determination (causality) of ICT adoption and development. The former acknowledges that the link between ICT and development may not be a direct one.
This simple approach is informative as an indirect test for the efficiency and consistence of parameters, as well avoiding potential endogeneity issues.
Results
Tables 1-5 present the results obtained from the 2SLS and the IV FE estimation of Equations 5 and 6 above. Specifically Table 1 Regarding control variables, economic and population growth have disadvantaged ICT adoption in this group of countries. This result is reasonable, because if population grows faster than GDP growth, then per capita GDP upon which the calculation of economic growth is based would be low and ICT adoption similarly constrained. Furthermore, if growth does not trickle down to the poor segment of the population, then population segments that are socially under-privileged are unlike to increase ICT adoption. Such a narrative would be consistent with the position that in Africa, the rich prefer quality to quantity of children, and therefore have fewer kids than the poor (Asongu, 2013) . Hence, population growth is mostly traceable to poor segments of the population. Overall, this interpretation is buttressed further by the fact that the recent growth resurgence in Africa that began in the mid 1990s has not benefited the poor (Fosu, 2015) . In fact, a World Bank report on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has revealed that the extreme poverty been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa where 45% of countries in SSA were susbtantially off-track from the MDG extreme povery target (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b) . While population and economic growth have demoted ICT adoption, openness to trade and human capital accumulation enhance ICT adoption in these countries.
By 2SLS formal institutions also promote ICT adoption meausred as internet penetration ( Table 2) . As with cellular (mobile) phone penetration, the quality of regulation is inversely correlated with ICT adoption in middle income countries. Unlike in the full sample, population growth, and trade allied with regulation, political stability, and the rule of law affect ICT when the sample is disaggregated by income levels. Even so, we can still say formal institutions, with the exception of the quality of regulation, improves ICT adoption in these countries. Howver, the improvement varies by income level. Accordingly, it is apparent from the results that ICT adoption in SSA is driven fundamentally by formal institutions more in low income countries than middle income countries. To examine the strengths of the 2SLS results, we ran the Hausman test for endogeneity, and the choice of the IV FE approach was based on that outcome. IV FE results are reported by Tables   3 and 4 . In this case government effectiveness and population growth demotes ICT adoption, all else have positive effects. Strangely, by income levels the IV FE estimator yields negative instituitional effects on ICT adoption except for the corruption. Moreover, for all 49 countries, corruption, regualtion, trade, and population growth assist ICT adoption, and all else have negative effects, although statistically insignificant in most cases. Disaggregated by income levels, political stability, and corruption decrease ICT adoption in low income countries, and ICT adoption is favored by political stability, regulatory quality , and government effectivenes in middle income coume countries. The negative effects may be tracaeable to the fact that formal institutions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ICT adoption when country-specific effects are considered. In interpretting the results, it is also important to note that the findings in Tables 1-2 obtained only with control for simultaneity, while those in Tables   3-4 result from controlling for both simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity. The broad implication herethen is that while formal institutions could enhance the adoption of ICT in SSA, sampled governments need to take into account country-specific institutional arrangements in the determination of ICT adoption policy outcomes. A corollary explanation may be that the weight of countries with negatively skewed government quality variables significantly influences the outcome of the sign of the estimated coefficient. ***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.IV: Instrumental Variable. Governance (Political stability/non violence, voice & accountability, regulation quality, government effectiveness, rule of law and corruption-control).
The findings in Table 5 are about ICT as a catalyst for inclusive development estimated by the 2SLS (Columns 2-5) and IV FE (Columns 6-9) methods. Full sample, ICT adoption (mobile phone and internet penetration) clearly and strongly affect inclusive human development. The effects of ICT adoption on development are comparable to those of private domestic credit availability and foreign direct investment. The fact that foreign aid limits inclusive human development is consistent with conclusions of Asongu (2014) in Africa. Moreover, positive effects of private domestic credit and foreign direct investment are also in accordance with recent inclusive growth/development literature on developing countries (Anand et al., 2012; Mlachila et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c) . Clearly, ICT adoption increases inclusive development, and the propensity to do so is higher in low income countries than in middle income countries. However, just as clearly, the evidence of this study shows that holding ICT adoption constant, there is competition between domestic factors and forces tending to increase development and external factors and forces ending the opposite direction. 
Conclusion
We have argued in the chapter that ICT adoption is a catalyst for inclusive development of developing countries, and scrutinized data for 49 African countries to support our argument.
Using 2SLS and IV FE strategies, first we examined the impact of formal institutions on ICT adoption and found them strong at both the aggregate and disaggregated levels, with government effectiveness having the largest positive effects and regulations the biggest negative effects. Overall formal institutions appear more important to ICT adoption in low income countries than in middle income countries, suggesting increasing returns to ICT in low income countries and constant or diminishing returns in middle income countries. Population and economic growth tend to constrain ICT adoption with low income countries more negatively affected than middle income countries. The classification is arbitrary. No particular line of reasoning is given for why the cut-off point is at $12,735, and there is no reason to believe that a country just below the cut-off line cannot be more "developed" than a country just above it. For instance, Equatorial Guinea has a higher income than both China and South Africa, but its industrial and technological structure is miles far behind. This is one of the reasons we modified the World Bank and group African countries into two groups: low income group consisting of 28 countries, and middle income group made up of 21 countries. This reclassification is consistent with our understanding of both ICT and development in these countries. The latter is broader than income level, the former more reflective of the general technological advancement of these countries. 
